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Building on Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sluchynsky's (2002) study of Americans' incentives to work full
or part time, this paper uses ESPlanner, a life-cycle financial planning program, in conjunction with
detailed modeling of transfer programs to determine a) total marginal net tax rates on current labor
supply, b) total net marginal tax rates on life-cycle labor supply, c) total net marginal tax rates on saving,
and d) the tax-arbitrage opportunities available from contributing to retirement accounts.  In seeking
to provide the most comprehensive analysis to date of fiscal incentives, the paper incorporates federal
and state personal income taxes, the FICA payroll tax, federal and state corporate income taxes, federal
and state sales and excise taxes, Social Security benefits, Medicare benefits, Medicaid benefits, Foods
Stamps, welfare (TAFCD) benefits, and other transfer program benefits.  The paper offers four main
takeaways. First, thanks to the incredible complexity of the U.S. fiscal system, it's impossible for anyone
to understand her incentive to work, save, or contribute to retirement accounts absent highly advanced
computer technology and software.  Second, the U.S. fiscal system provides most households with
very strong reasons to limit their labor supply and saving.  Third, the system offers very high-income
young and middle aged households as well as most older households tremendous opportunities to arbitrage
the tax system by contributing to retirement accounts.  Fourth, the patterns by age and income of marginal
net tax rates on earnings, marginal net tax rates on saving, and tax-arbitrage opportunities can be summarized
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I.  Introduction 
Households  both  want  and  need  to  understand  the  incentives  they  face  at  the 
margin  for  working  and  saving.    Yet  any  American  seeking  to  understand  her  total 
effective net marginal tax on either choice faces a daunting challenge.  First, she needs to 
consider a host of taxes and transfers including federal personal income taxes, federal 
corporate income taxes, federal payroll taxes, federal excise taxes, state personal income 
taxes, state corporate income taxes, state sales taxes, state excise taxes, Social Security 
benefits,  welfare  benefits  (TAFDC),  Supplemental  Security  Income  benefits  (SSI), 
Medicaid benefits, Medicare benefit, food stamps, nutrition benefits (WIC), and energy 
assistance benefits (LIHEAP).  Second, she needs to understand in very fine detail how 
each  of  these  taxes  and  transfers  is  calculated.    Third,  she  needs  to  understand  the 
interactions of the different tax and transfer programs.  Fourth, she needs to consider the 
fact that these taxes and transfers are paid and received over time.  And fifth, she needs to 
have a method for translating all of these interconnected time-dated tax payments and 
benefit receipts into a simple and comprehensible statement of her marginal reward for 
working and saving.     
  This paper uses ESPlanner
TM (Economic Security Planner
TM) in conjunction with 
detailed  modeling  of  non-Social  Security  transfer  programs  (ESPlanner  incorporates 
Social  Security)  to  generate  total  effective  (net)  marginal  taxes  on  labor  supply  and 
saving for stylized American households.  It also examines the tax arbitrage opportunity 
available to households from saving in either a) 401(k), traditional IRA, or other tax-
deferred retirement accounts or b) Roth IRAs, Roth 401(k)s, or other Roth accounts. 
The paper builds and draws on Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sluchynsky (2002) which   2 
studied the incentives of Americans to work full or part time.  That study showed that the 
overall tax/transfer system is progressive, particularly at the very low end of the earnings 
distribution, that all households face very high marginal taxes on the choice of working 
full  or  part  time,  that  many  low-  and  moderate-income  households  face  substantially 
higher marginal taxes on working full or part time than do high-income households, and 
that many low-income households face confiscatory taxes on switching from full to part 
time work or from switching from full-time work by one spouse to full-time work by 
both spouses.   
The  value  added  of  this  paper  relative  to  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff,  and  Sluchynsky 
(2002) is that we consider the marginal net taxes on working extra hours in the current 
year, working extra hours throughout one’s career, and increasing one’s current saving.  
We also examine the tax arbitrage opportunity available to different households from 
contributing to a) 401(k), traditional IRA, or similar tax-deferred accounts or b) Roth 
IRAs, Roth 401(k)s, or other Roth accounts. 
With the exception of certain very low-earning households, we find high to very 
high marginal net tax rates – ranging from 24 to 45 percent -- on current and life-cycle 
labor supply.  These calculations are made at particular levels of pre-tax and pre-transfer 
earnings and  are based  on discrete increments in earnings.  As  we also demonstrate, 
marginal net tax rates on current and life-cycle labor supply are astronomical over much 
smaller increments in gross earnings at particular levels of earnings at which income and 
asset eligibility tests of particular tax and transfer programs become relevant. 
The Congressional Budget Office’s (2005) recent study of effective tax rates on 
labor supply reports much lower marginal rates, particularly for low-income households,   3 
than those we report.  The reason is that the CBO ignores transfer payments and federal 
and state sales and excise taxes.  
At low incomes (when transfer benefits are often linked directly to income) our 
estimates of marginal effective rates are 80 to 100 percentage points higher than the CBO 
in some cases. For example, 60 year old couples earning $10,000/yr are within the EITC 
phase-in region, which results in a CBO estimated marginal rate of -40%. However, at 
this income they also face a one-for-one reduction in food stamps. After accounting for 
all of the relevant transfer programs, the resulting effective marginal rate is 50%, or 90 
percentage points higher than the CBO estimate. Aside from these few extreme cases, the 
differences  are  smaller,  but  still  substantial.  Our  estimates  for  low-  to  mid-income 
households are 30 to 50 points higher than the CBO, and 10 to 25 points higher for mid- 
to high-income households.  
In addition to finding high to very high marginal net taxes on labor supply for 
virtually all American households, we also find high to very high marginal net tax rates 
on saving for most households.   For some low-income households, we find astronomical 
net tax rates on saving; for these households higher saving means higher future assets and 
higher  asset income, which can reduce eligibility  for transfer payments via asset and 
income tests.   Finally, we find huge arbitrage opportunities for particular households of 
particular ages and earnings levels from contributing to either tax-deferred retirement 
accounts or Roth IRAs, Roth 401(k)s, or other Roth accounts.   
The  paper  provides  four  main  takeaways.  First,  thanks  to  the  incredible 
complexity of the U.S. fiscal system, it’s essentially impossible for anyone to understand 
her incentive to work, save, or contribute to retirement accounts absent highly advanced   4 
computer  technology  and  software.    Second,  the  U.S.  fiscal  system  provides  most 
households with very strong reasons to limit their labor supply and saving.  Third, the 
system offers very high-income young and middle aged households as well as most older 
households  tremendous  opportunities  to  arbitrage  the  tax  system  by  contributing  to 
retirement accounts.  Fourth, the patterns by age and income of marginal net tax rates on 
earnings,  marginal  net  tax  rates  on  saving,  and  tax-arbitrage  opportunities  can  be 
summarized with one word – bizarre.  
We proceed in section II by laying out our methods for measuring total marginal 
net taxes on working additional hours and on saving.  Section III describes ESPlanner 
and its use in this paper.  Section IV presents our stylized households.  Section V presents 
results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  Measuring  Total  Effective  Marginal  Tax  Rates  and  the  Tax  Arbitrage 
Opportunities Afforded by Retirement Accounts 
Economists measure the gain from extra work or saving in terms of its potential 
impact on consumption.  The gain from extra current work is typically measured in terms 
of its maximum impact on current consumption.  Thus, if a worker earns an extra $100 
this year, permitting this year’s consumption to rise, at most, by $50, we say the worker 
faces a 50 percent effective marginal tax on her labor supply.  The terms “effective” 
reference marginal taxes paid net of marginal transfer payments received.  Since a large 
component of some households’ incomes, particular those of low income households, 
comes from government transfer programs, including such payments in the analysis of 
earnings and saving incentives is essential.     5 
Of  course  working  and  earning  more  in  the  current  year  is  just  one  potential 
margin of choice when it comes to expanding labor supply.  We say “potential” because 
some workers may be in jobs in which the hours they work are pre-set by their employer 
and  can’t  be  changed.    For  such  workers,  the  only  way  to  adjust  their  annual  hours 
worked is to switch jobs.  
In this paper we calculate net marginal tax rates on working additional hours in 
just the current year.  But we also determine the net marginal incentives associated with 
permanently adjusting annual hours worked by switching from a job with a low fixed-
level of annual hours to one with a high fixed-level of annual hours.  We refer to such a 
job change as an increase in life-cycle labor supply.  To measure this net tax rate we 
compare the change in the present value lifetime income before any taxes and transfer 
payments  arising  from  a  uniform  increase  in  annual  hours  (and  earnings,  since  we 
consider  fixed  real  wages  per  hour)  to  the  change  in  the  present  value  of  lifetime 
spending permitted by this additional labor supply.   
Our third marginal tax of interest is that on extra saving.  The gain from extra 
saving can be measured in terms of the impact on future consumption of forgoing a fixed 
amount of current consumption.  Consider, for example, a two-period (youth and old age) 
framework.  In the absence of any effective marginal tax on saving, reducing current 
consumption when young by $100 would lead to an increase in consumption when old, 
measured  in  present  value,  of  exactly  $100.    If  consumption  when  old,  measured  in 
present value, rises by only $50, the saver faces a 50 percent marginal net tax on saving.
1  
Our analysis involves, of course, households that live for many years, not just two 
                                                            
1 Alternatively, we can say that the tax on future consumption is 100 percent since the price, measured in 
present value, of consuming $100 when old has risen from $50 to $100.     6 
periods.  When there is more than one period (more than one future year) in which to 
consume, there is no standard definition of the effective tax rate on saving.  One could, 
for example, consider how much reducing this year’s consumption by, say, $100 will 
increase the present value of future consumption spending assuming the additional future 
spending power is all allocated to next year’s consumption.  Alternatively, one could 
allocate all the future spending power to consumption 10 years out, or 20 years out, or in 
any future year one chooses.  One could also spread the extra spending power uniformly 
over all future years.  Each such choice will generate a different measure of the effective 
tax rate.  The reason is that the longer one pushes out the allocation of the extra spending 
power, the higher will be the effective tax rate thanks to the nature of compounding.   
Our response to this surfeit of computable saving tax rates is to present the saving 
rate associated with reducing  current consumption and raising all future consumption 
levels by the same percentage.  More precisely, we compare the present value increase in 
future spending that can be financed by a given reduction in current spending assuming 
that spending in each future year rises by the same percentage.     
  Our final goal is to illustrate the arbitrage opportunities available to households 
for saving in either a) 401(k), traditional IRA, or tax-deferred accounts or b) Roth IRAs, 
Roth 401(k)s, or other Roth accounts.   As described below, we arrange this analysis such 
that one can directly compare the arbitrage the arbitrage opportunities from contribution 
to tax-deferred accounts with those from contributing to Roth IRAs, Roth 401(k)s, or 
other Roth accounts.   
 
   7 
Accounting for Transfer Payments 
Both marginal earnings  and marginal saving can alter the amount of transfers 
received, which will, in turn, affect the calculation of effective tax rates.  As is well 
known,  marginal-transfer  schedules  are  highly  non-linear.    For  example,  in 
Massachusetts  –  the  state  in  which  we  assume  our  stylized  households  reside,  a 
household is eligible to receive welfare (TAFDC) if its assets are below $2500. If this 
household  currently  receives  welfare  and  holds  $2499  in  assets,  an  additional  dollar 
saved  will  render  it  TAFDC-ineligible.    As  another  example,  consider  a  two-parent 
family that earns $25,736 per year in labor income and has two dependent children.  In 
Massachusetts,  this  family  is  eligible  to  receive  nearly  $14,000  in  transfers,  most  of 
which come from Medicaid.
2  Earning an additional dollar or, indeed, an extra penny, 
causes the family to lose Medicaid eligibility.   
Accounting for government transfer programs in the estimation of tax rates raises 
three  issues.    One  is  simply  their  accurate  measurement,  which  requires  taking  into 
account  each  program’s  eligibility,  income,  and  asset  tests.    This  is  a  significant 
undertaking given that ESPlanner does not compute transfer payments apart from Social 
Security benefits.  As described in the Appendix, our transfer benefit calculator assesses 
household eligibility for each of the transfer programs and applies all applicable income 
and asset taxes in determining benefit levels.    
The second issue is the fungibility of transfer payments.  Certain benefits, like 
Medicare and Medicaid, are in-kind and must be consumed in the year received.  Others, 
like TAFDC and, potentially, Food Stamps are fungible.  Ideally, one would want to enter 
                                                            
2 In assuming that eligible households receive average benefits from transfer programs like Medicaid to 
particular households we are ignoring the insurance value of these programs   8 
fungible  benefits  as  special  receipts  in  ESPlanner  and  treat  non-fungible  benefits  as 
consumption in the year they are received.  But given the time involved in entering a 
large number of fungible special receipts in a large number of ESPlanner profiles, we 
opted to treat all transfer payments as non-fungible, i.e., as consumed in the year they are 
received.   
A third challenge in incorporating transfer payments is identifying the precise 
point at which marginal net tax rates spike.  As is well known, marginal net tax rates can 
be extremely high at certain levels of earnings and saving because of the discontinuous 
nature of tax and transfer schedules.
3  The examples just sighted in which earning extra 
penny of income trigger major losses in TAFCD and Medicaid benefits are cases in point.  
Identifying  these  spikes  requires  considering  very  small  increments  in  earnings  and 
saving in the range of earnings and saving where such spikes are known to occur.  Our 
initial analysis uses discreet increments equal to the maximum of $100 or 1 percent of 
earnings to determine the general pattern of labor supply incentives.  We then consider 
much smaller increments to determine precisely where marginal net tax rates spike.  
 
Calculating Marginal Net Taxes on Current Labor Supply 
To calculate marginal net tax rates on current labor supply we simply calculate 
the marginal income net of taxes and gross of transfer payments that would be generated 
from earning additional income in the current year and then assume this additional net 
income is spent in the current year.
4  To determine how much current net income rises for 
                                                            
3 If one could earn infinitesimal amounts, effective marginal net tax rates in these cases would be infinite.  
But since the smallest increment one can earn is a penny, effective marginal net tax rates, while potentially 
extremely high, are finite.  
4  In maintaining fixed current saving, we’re ensuring no change in future incomes and transfer payments   9 
a given increment in current earnings, we run each of our stylized households through 
ESPlanner as well as through our annual transfer benefit calculator twice – first, based on 
their initial levels of earnings and then based on an incremented level of earnings.   
Equation (1) provides a formula for the our net tax rate,  c t , on current labor 
supply.  In the formula,  E D  stands for the change in current-year labor earnings,  T D  for 
the change in current-year taxes,  X D  for the change in current-year transfer payments 
received,  s q  for the state sales tax, and  e q  for the rate of federal excise taxation.
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= t .  But 
the  standard  formula  ignores  sales  and  excise  taxes;  i.e.,  it  treats  both s q and  e q   as 
equaling zero.  This is clearly inappropriate since sales and excise taxes, like income and 
payroll taxes, limit the amount of actual consumption (not consumption expenditure) a 
worker can enjoy by working more and earning more income.
6  Dividing the change in 
expenditure associated with additional earnings ( E D - T D - X D ) by the sales- and excise-
tax inclusive consumer price of a dollar of expenditure,  (1+ s q + e q ), determines how 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with one exception – future Social Security benefits.  These benefits are potentially changed due to the 
presence of higher current earnings in the worker’s ultimate earnings record.  Including the impact of these 
Social Security benefit changes on current consumption is a goal of our future research.  However, it’s 
important to bear in mind that Social Security benefit changes, to the extent they arise, can only influence 
current  spending  insofar  as  the  worker  (or  household  to  which  the  worker  belongs)  is  not  liquidity 
constrained.  Many of our stylized households are so constrained. 
5 The sales tax in Massachusetts is 5%, and the federal excise tax accounts for approximately 0.9% of 
aggregate consumption in the U.S. Hence, we set s q = 0.05 and  e q = 0.009. 
6 Sales and excise taxes also represent taxes on wealth since, like earnings, when wealth is spent, the 
spender pays these taxes and ends up getting less actual consumption than would otherwise be the case.    10 
much actual consumption a worker ends up with if she increases her earnings by  E D .
7   
 
Calculating Marginal Net Taxes on Life-Cycle Labor Supply  











t ,    
where PV￿C denotes the change in the present value of total consumption and other “off-
the-top” spending (on housing, insurance premiums, and special expenditures) and PV￿E 
denotes  the  change  in  the  present  value  of  lifetime  earnings  arising  from  a  uniform 
increase in annual earnings.   As discussed in more detail shortly, the discount rate used 
to form these present values is the return before both corporate and individual taxes. 
  To calculate PV￿C we a) use ESPlanner to calculate the present value of total 
spending (consumption spending, housing spending, special expenditures, and insurance 
premiums)  given  base-case  annual  earnings  and  b)  add  to  this  present  value  of  total 
spending  the  present  value  of  transfer  payments  accruing  to  the  household  given 
ESPlanner’s calculated annual time path of annual total income and assets.  Next we 
increase annual household earnings by a fixed amount each year (specifically, 1 percent 
of  each  household’s  assumed  fixed  annual  real  earnings)  through  retirement  and  use 
ESPlanner plus our transfer calculator to obtain new present values of remaining lifetime 
earnings and total spending.  Differencing the new and previously derived present values 
of  total  spending  provides  the  numerator  in  (2).    The  denominator  is  determined  by 
                                                            
7 In a static setting a worker’s budget constraint is (1+ s q + e q )C = w(1-￿), where ￿ is the sum of income 
and payroll tax rates and w is the pre-tax wage.  But one can rewrite this constraint as  
C = w(1-￿)/(1+ s q + e q ).  Letting ￿
e stand for the effective tax rate on labor supply, we have C = w(1-￿
e), 
where ￿
e = 1 - (1-￿)/(1+ s q + e q ), which is the same as equation (1).    11 
simply forming the present value of annual increases in pre-tax and pre-transfer payments 
earnings.  
  Since  ESPlanner  smooths  households’  living  standards  subject  to  borrowing 
constraints,  it  will  spend  extra  earnings  in  a  given  year  on  consumption  in  all  years 
provided doing so does not violate the user-specified limit on borrow.  For purposes of 
calculating  l t  we specify this limit at zero.  To the extent that borrowing constraints 
permit, ESPlanner will freely spend in one year earnings generated in another.  In so 
doing, the program will alter the time path of regular asset, regular asset income, and 
taxes levied on regular asset income.  Hence, our tax rate  l t  on life-cycle earnings will 
pick up more than simply taxes levied on earnings.  It will also capture marginal taxation 
of saving.  Thus, we don’t claim  l t  to represent solely a marginal net tax on life-cycle 
earnings, but rather a marginal net tax on increased annual earnings that is then subject to 
as much consumption smoothing as possible.
8  
 
Calculating Effective Marginal Taxes on Regular Saving 
As  indicated,  we  measure  the  effective  tax  rate  on  saving  assuming  that  the 
reduction in 2005 spending is allocated uniformly to all future periods such that the living 
standard in all future periods rises by the same percentage.  To effect this outcome in 
ESPlanner we do two things.  First, we permit all our stylized households to borrow as 
much  as  the  need  in  order  to  fully  smooth  their  living  standards  as  well  as  to  use 
                                                            
8 Roughly two-thirds of young American households appear to be liquidity constrained (see Kotlikoff, 
Marx, and Rizza, 2006).  This doesn’t necessarily mean that they have zero current fungible assets.  Instead 
it means that their living standard per person in the future will be higher than it is in the present and that 
whatever saving they are doing is for purposes of smoothing their living standards in the short or medium 
runs.  Like typical young households, all but the highest earning of our stylized young households are 
liquidity constrained.  
   12 
additional current saving to effect a uniform rise in their future living standards.
9  Second, 
we  raise  the  program’s  living  standard  index  for  all  years  from  2006  onward  by  10 
percent and compared the increase in the present value of consumption spending from 
2006  onward  with  the  associated  reduction  in  consumption  spending  in  2005.    This 
second step leads the program to lower current consumption spending, while increasing 
future consumption spending each year by the same percentage, thus effecting a uniform 
rise in living standard in all future years. 
The  discount  rate  used  to  determine  the  present  value  change  in  future 
consumption, all measured in 2005 dollars, is 7.0 percent, which is our assumed pre- all 
taxes real rate of return.  This pre-tax return is the return one would receive before the 
application of any federal and state personal or corporate income taxes.  In using this 
return, we are, in effect, incorporating marginal effective corporate capital income taxes 
as well as marginal effective personal capital income taxes. 
To see why one needs to discount at the pre- all taxes return, consider a two-
period framework with lifetime household budget constraint given by 
 
(3)   ) 1 /( ) 1 /( ) 1 /( r T T r e e r c c o y o y o y + - - + + = + + . 
 
The return r is pre all taxes.  The terms cy and co stand for consumption when young and 
old.  The terms ey, eo, Ty, and Tc stand, respectively, for pre-tax earnings when young, pre-
tax earnings when old, net taxes paid when young, and net taxes paid when old.  Net 
taxes here are comprehensive; for example, taxes when old include, in the U.S. context, 
corporate income taxes, personal capital income taxes, personal labor income taxes, state 
                                                            
9 In assuming that all of our stylized households are able to borrow, we don’t mean to suggest that such 
borrowing is feasible.  Instead, we seek to understand how our tax-transfer system affects the incentive to 
save were households actually able to do so.        13 
income taxes, payroll taxes, sales taxes, and excise taxes net of all manner of available 
transfer payments.  
Consumption, earnings, and taxes when old are discounted at rate r.  For a given 
reduction in current consumption equal, say, to ￿cy, the marginal net tax rate on saving, 
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t .   
The formula for ￿s tells us the percentage degree to which the present value of future 
consumption, ￿co/(1+r), fails to rise by the same amount (in absolute value) that current 
consumption falls; i.e., were ￿s to equal zero, ￿co/(1+r) would equal - ￿cy according to (3) 
under our assumption that  ) 1 /( r e e o y + + don’t change.  
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 and subtracting 1 from the resulting ratio.   
Now we know r, but how do we determine ￿co? For purposes of this study, the answer is 
that  we  use  ESPlanner  to  determine  ￿co  (actually,  the  change  in  each  future  year’s 
consumption).   
To be clear, ESPlanner is operating not off the budget constraint (3), but off the 
following budget constraint,  






o y + - - + + = + + , 
where  r
n  is  the  return  households  earn  pre-individual  capital  income  taxes,  but  post 
corporate income taxes and T
n
o are individual income taxes paid when old (i.e., T
n
o does 
not  include  corporate  income  tax  payments).    Given  the  assumed  linearity  of  the   14 
corporate income tax, the two budget constraints (3) and (4) are mutually consistent, so 
there is no problem using (4) to determine ￿co and then plugging this amount into the 
formula 1 - ￿co/(1+r)/ - ￿cy to form the desired marginal net tax rate on saving.  To see 
this, write r
n = r(1- ￿c), where ￿c is the corporate income tax rate.  If one substitutes this 
expression for r
n in (4) and notes that To -  T
n
o  = (eo –Ty –cy) r ￿c (i.e., the two variables 
differ by the amount of the corporate tax revenue), one arrives at (3).  
 
Return Assumptions Used in Running ESPlanner  
In running ESPlanner we enter an 8.33 percent nominal rate of return.  Given our 
3 percent inflation rate assumption, this translates into a 5.17 percent post-corporate tax 
real return.
10  We use a 7.0 percent real pre-corporate tax rate of rate (the r in equation 
(3)) to do the discounting needed to form tax rates on life-cycle labor supply and saving.  
We arrived at these values based on consultations with Jane Gravelle.  
 
Assessing the Tax-Arbitrage Opportunities in Contributing to Retirement Accounts 
  So far we’ve considered only marginal net taxation of regular saving.  But much 
of household saving is currently being done within either 401(k) and other tax-deferred 
retirement  accounts  or  within  Roth  IRAs,  Roth  401(k)s,  or  other  Roth  accounts.  
Contributing to these accounts does not, however, necessarily entail any reduction in 
current consumption.  Indeed, contributing to these accounts represents a tax arbitrage 
opportunity if, as we’ve been assuming, households are not liquidity constrained.   
To assess these tax-arbitrage opportunities we measure the increase in the present 
value of all consumption -- current as well as future – per net dollar contributed to either 
                                                            
10 The formula for the real return is actually (1+i)/(1+￿ )-1.     15 
type of retirement account.  The “net” in “per net dollar” refers to the contribution net of 
current taxes saved.  Thus, if we have a household contribute X to a 401(k) account and it 
saves the household Y in current taxes, we define the net dollar contribution to be X–Y.  
This is the amount by which the household’s liquid assets are reduced by the transactions.  
Since Roth contributions are made before tax and do not affect current taxable income, 
we consider contributions of size X-Y in order to maintain comparability with respect to 
our analysis of contributions to tax-deferred accounts.  
Our analysis here does not include any marginal employer matching contribution.  
The reason is that we want to understand the pure tax arbitrage incentives presented by 
retirement  “saving”  as  opposed  to  the  incentive  to  “save”  in  retirement  accounts 
presented by employers.  
 
III.  Using ESPlanner to Measure Total Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
The methods discussed above to calculate marginal net taxes on life-cycle labor 
supply and on saving require the use of a dynamic life-cycle model that jointly calculates 
all  future  taxes  and  transfer  payments.    ESPlanner  is  clearly  one  such  model.    It 
determines a household’s highest sustainable living standard within each non-liquidity 
constrained  interval  of  its  life  and  the  consumption,  saving,  and  term  life  insurance 
holdings needed to smooth the household’s living standard within each non-constrained 
interval.    The  program  uses  dynamic  programming  in  forming  its  recommendations.  
Dynamic programming is needed to deal both with potential borrowing constraints and 
with non-negativity constraints on life insurance holdings.   
The  program  takes  into  account  the  following  user-specified  inputs:  the   16 
household’s state of residence, current and future planned children and their years of 
birth, current and future regular and self-employment earnings, current and future special 
expenditures  and  receipts  (as  well  as  their  tax  status),  current  and  future  levels  of  a 
reserve fund, current regular and retirement account balances, current and future own and 
employer contributions to retirement accounts (with Roth account contributions treated 
separately),  current  and  future  primary  and  vacation  home  values,  mortgages,  rental 
expenses, and other housing expenditures, current and future states of residence, ages of 
retirement account withdrawals, ages of initial Social Security benefit receipt, past and 
future covered Social Security earnings, desired funeral expenses and bequests, current 
regular saving and life insurance holdings, the economies of shared living, the relative 
cost of children, the extent of future changes in Social Security benefits, the extent of 
future changes in federal income taxes, FICA taxes, and state income taxes, current and 
future pension and annuities (including lump sum and survivor benefits), the degree to 
which the household will annuitize its retirement account assets, and values of future 
earnings, special expenditures, receipts, and other variables in survivor states in which 
either the head or her spouse/partner is deceased.  
The living standard of members of a household is defined by ESPlanner as the 
amount of consumption expenditure an adult would need to make to enjoy as a single 
person  with  no  children  the  same  living  standard  she  enjoys  in  the  household.    The 
equation  relating  a  household’s  living  standard  per  member  to  its  total  consumption 
expenditure  takes  into  account  economies  in  shared  living  and  the  relative  cost  of 
children.
11  Consumption expenditure is defined by ESPlanner as all expenditures apart 
                                                            
11 Let C stand for a household’s total consumption expenditure, s for its living standard per equivalent 
adult, ki for the number of children age i, ￿i for relative cost of a child age i, N for the number of adults, and   17 
from special expenditures, such  as college tuition for  children, housing expenditures, 
taxes, life insurance premiums, regular saving, and contributions to retirement accounts.  
 
ESPlanner’s Tax Calculations 
ESPlanner  makes  highly  detailed  federal  income,  FICA,  and  state-specific 
income tax as well as Social Security benefit calculations.  These tax and benefit levels 
are  the  only  non-user  specified  variables  influencing  the  program’s  consumption 
smoothing calculations. 
The program’s federal and state income-tax calculators determine whether the 
household should itemize its deductions, compute deductions and exemptions, deduct 
from taxable income contributions to tax-deferred retirement accounts, include in taxable 
income  withdrawals  from  such  accounts  as  well  as  the  taxable  component  of  Social 
Security benefits, check, in the case of federal income taxes, for Alternative Minimum 
Tax liability, and calculate total tax liabilities after all applicable refundable and non-
refundable tax credits including the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Credit, and the 
Saver’s credit.  These federal and state tax calculations are made separately for each year 
that the couple is alive as well as for each year a survivor may be alive.   
Given the non-linearity of tax functions, one can’t determine a household’s tax 
rates in future years without knowing its regular asset and other taxable income in those 
years.  But one can’t determine how much a household will consume and save and thus 
have  in  asset  income  in  future  years  without  knowing  the  household’s  future  taxes.  
Hence, there is a chicken and egg problem -- a simultaneity problem -- that needs to be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
￿  for  the  degree  of  economies  of  shared  living.    The  relationship  between  C  and  s  in  a  given  year 
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resolved to make sure that consumption and saving decisions are consistent with the 
future tax payments they help engender.     
 
ESPlanner’s Social Security Benefit Calculations 
In  determining  Social  Security  benefits  the  program  takes  full  account  of  the 
earnings test, early retirement reduction factors, the delayed retirement credit, the re-
computation  of  benefits,  the  family  benefit  maximum,  the  phase-in  to  the  system’s 
ultimate  age-67  normal  retirement  age,  as  well  as  offset  and  windfall  elimination 
provisions. 
ESPlanner’s survivor tax and benefit calculations for surviving wives (husbands) 
are  made  separately  for  each  possible  date  of  death  of  the  husband  (wife).    I.e., 
ESPlanner considers separately each date the husband (wife) might die and calculates the 
taxes and benefits a surviving wife (husband) and her (his) children would receive each 
year  thereafter.    Moreover,  in  calculating  survivor-state  specific  retirement,  survivor, 
mother, father, and child dependent and survivor Social Security benefits, ESPlanner 
takes account of all the just-mentioned benefit adjustment factors.  
 
Checking the Calculations   
Each component of ESPlanner’s tax code and transfer calculator, whether it be 
the basics of the 1040 form, the provisions of the Earned Income Tax Credit, the details 
of the Alternative Minimum Tax, the tax treatment of housing capital gains, the taxation 
of Social Security benefits, the TAFDC earnings test, the payment in the case of low-
income  households  of  Medicare  premiums  by  Medicaid,  etc.  --  has  been  rigorously   19 
checked on a component by component basis.  This is not to say that no bugs were found.  
On the contrary, a goodly number were found thanks to independent checking over the 
years by three software engineers and  four economists as well as a large number of 
ESPlanner users, including professional financial planners, who have examined the tax 
and Social Security benefit calculations with extremely sharp eyes.
12   
 
ESPlanner’s Algorithm 
ESPlanner  generates  recommended  levels  of  annual  consumption  expenditure, 
saving, and term life insurance holdings.  All recommendations are presented in today’s 
dollars.  Consumption in this context is everything the household gets to spend after 
paying for its “off-the-top” expenditures – its housing expenses, special expenditures, life 
insurance  premiums,  special  bequests,  taxes,  and  net  contributions  to  tax-favored 
accounts.    Given  the  household’s  demographic  information,  preferences,  borrowing 
constraints, and non-negativity constraints on life insurance, ESPlanner calculates the 
highest  sustainable  and  smoothest  possible  living  standard  over  time,  leaving  the 
household with zero terminal assets (apart from the equity in homes that the user has 
chosen not to sell) if either the household head, her spouse/partner, or both live to their 
maximum ages of life.   
                                                            
12 Indeed, in the case of Social Security benefit calculations, a number of individual users and financial 
planners have double checked ESPlanner’s Social Security’s benefit calculations with those produced by 
Social  Security  Administration’s  detailed  ANYPIA  calculator.    A  number  have  complained  that 
ESPlanner’s calculated benefits were too high.  As they were told, ESPlanner’s benefit projections accord 
precisely with those of the ANYPIA calculator in the case of users whose covered earnings all lie in the 
past.  But in the case of users with projected future covered earnings, ESPlanner’s projection of future 
benefits differ from the ANYPIA’s projection for a simple reason.  The ANYPIA calculator assumes no 
future rise in the U.S. price level and no future real wage growth.  This seems remarkable until one realizes 
that the government doesn’t want to be in a position of implicitly promising higher benefits than it knows 
for sure it will pay. 
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The  amount  of  recommended  consumption  expenditures  needed  to  achieve  a 
given living standard varies from year to year in response to changes in the household’s 
composition.  Moreover, the relationship between consumption and living standard in a 
given  year  is  non-linear  for  two  reasons.    First,  a  non-linear  function  governs  the 
program’s  assumed  economies  of  shared  living,  with  the  function  depending  on  the 
number of equivalent adults.  Second, the program permits users to specify that children 
are less or more expensive than adults in terms of delivering a given living standard.  The 
default setting is that a child is 70 percent as expensive as an adult.  Hence a household 
with 2 adults and 2 children is specified, under the default assumptions, to entail 3.4 
equivalent adults.   
The program’s recommended consumption also rises when the household moves 
from a situation of being liquidity constrained to one of being unconstrained.  Finally, 
recommended  household  consumption  will  change  over  time  if  users  intentionally 
specify, via the program’s standard of living index, that they want their living standard to 
change.   
Dealing with the simultaneity issues as well as the borrowing and non-negative 
life insurance constraints all within a single dynamic program appears impossible given 
the  large  number  of  state  variables  such  an  approach  entails.
13    To  overcome  this 
                                                            
13 The simultaneity issue with respect to taxes mentioned above is just one of two such issues that need to 
be considered.  The second is the joint determination of life insurance holdings of potential decedents and 
survivors.  ESPlanner recognizes that widows and widowers may need to hold life insurance in order to 
protect their children’s living standard through adulthood and to cover bequests, funeral expenses, and 
debts (including mortgages) that exceed the survivor’s net worth inclusive of the equity on her/his house.  
Accordingly, the software calculates these life insurance requirements and reports them in its survivor 
reports.  However, the more life insurance is purchased by the potential decedent, the less life insurance 
survivors will need to purchase, assuming they have such a need.  But this means survivors will pay less in 
life insurance premiums and have less need for insurance protection from their decedent spouse/partner.  
Hence,  one  can’t  determine  the  potential  decedent’s  life  insurance  holdings  until  one  determines  the 
survivor’s holdings.  But one can’t determine the survivor’s holdings until one determines the decedent’s 
holdings.    21 
problem, ESPlanner uses an iterative method of dynamic programming.  Specifically, the 
program has two dynamic programs that pass data to one another on an iterative basis 
until they both converge to a single mutually consistent solution to many decimal points 
of accuracy.   
One program takes age-specific life insurance premium payments as given and 
calculates the household’s consumption smoothing conditional on these payments.  The 
other program takes the output of this consumption smoothing program -- the living 
standard  in  each  year  that  needs  to  be  protected  –  as  given.    This  second  program 
calculates  how  much  life  insurance  is  needed  by  both  potential  decedents  and  their 
surviving spouses/partners.   
This iterative procedure also deals with our two simultaneity issues.  The trick 
here is to form initial guesses of future taxes and survivor life insurance holdings and 
update  these  guesses  across  successive  iterations  based  on  values  of  these  variables 
endogenously generated by the program in the previous iteration.  When the program 
concludes its calculations, current spending is fully consistent with future taxes and vice 
versa, and the recommended life insurance holdings of heads and spouses/partners are 
fully consistent with the recommended life insurance holdings of survivors.   
 
Accounting for Employer-Paid FICA Taxes and Corporate Income Taxes 
Since users enter their earnings net of employer-paid FICA taxes ESPlanner does 
not explicitly calculate these taxes.  Nor does it explicitly calculate corporate income 
taxes since users enter their expected returns net of such taxes.  From an economics 
perspective, employer-paid payroll taxes are no less of a burden or a work or saving 
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disincentive  than  are  those  paid  directly  by  employees.    Indeed,  there  is  only  one 
economic difference between employer-paid and employee-paid payroll taxes; employer-
paid  payroll  taxes  are  excludable  from  the  calculation  of  adjusted  gross  income  in 
determining federal personal income tax liability, whereas employee-paid payroll taxes 
are not.   
Our procedure for including the employer FICA tax is to input into ESPlanner a 
given increase in earnings, say X (where X is either an increase in current earnings or an 
increase in the present value of future earnings), and compare the associated increase in 
spending not with X, but with X plus the additional FICA tax paid on X.  This sum 
represents the full pre-tax compensation being paid to the household.   
Like employer-paid payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, both federal and state, 
also reduce the return to input suppliers.  But unlike payroll taxes, where the input supply 
is labor, the input supply relevant to the corporate income tax is household saving.  This 
saving helps finance corporations, and when corporations have to pay taxes, they can’t 
pay as high a return to their investors.  To capture this discrepancy between the pre- and 
post-corporate tax rates of return, we use the pre-corporate tax discussed above in all the 
discounting used to form present values.  However, in actually running ESPlanner, we 
enter the post-corporate return as an input in the program since, to repeat, ESPlanner 
doesn’t calculate corporate taxes.   
 
 
Non-Social Security Transfers 
As indicated, our transfer calculator determines the level of benefits of seven   23 
government  programs  available  to  residents  of  Massachusetts:  Transitional  Aid  to 
Families with Dependent Children (TAFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food 
Stamps, Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women with Infants and Children 
(WIC),  Medicare,  Medicaid,  and  Low  Income  Home  Energy  Assistance  Program 
(LIHEAP).    For  each  year  of  potential  life  of  our  stylized  households,  we  consider 
whether the household is eligible for the transfer based on it demographics, income, and 
assets  and,  if  eligible,  compute  the  appropriate  benefit  level  taking  into  account  any 
relevant earnings and asset tests.  These provisions can include earnings deductions, net 
income  adjustments  (such  as  non-reimbursed  out-of-pocket  medical  expenses),  child 
deductions, and housing deductions. Often the earnings tests are tied explicitly to the 
federal poverty lines, which vary by the number of household members.  
 
IV.  Our Stylized Households 
Our stylized households consist of either single individuals or married couples, 
whose spouses are the same age.  We consider households age 30, 45, and 60.  Both the 
single-headed households and the married households have two children to whom they 
gave birth at ages 27 and 29.  Table 1 lists key assumptions about the seven single and 
seven married households we consider. The single households have initial labor earnings 
ranging from $0 to $250,000.  For the married couples, the spread is double that of the 
singles, i.e., it ranges from $0 to $500,000. All household heads and spouses retire and 
start collecting Social Security benefits at age 65.  Earnings between the household’s 
current (2005) age and retirement at the beginning of age 65 are assumed to remain fixed 
in real terms.    24 
Each  household  is  assumed  to  have  a  home,  a  mortgage,  and  non-mortgage 
housing expenses.  The 30 year-old households have initial assets equal to a quarter of a 
year’s  earnings.    The  older  households  are  assumed  to  have  the  same  assets  that 
ESPlanner determines the 30 year-olds to have at the age at which we consider the older 
households.  The households are also assumed to incur non-housing expenses, the most 
significant component of which is annual college tuition.  For ease of implementation, 
and to avoid unrealistic profiles, tuition is assumed to be a quarter of a year’s earnings, 
subject to a ceiling of $50,000 per child. The households pay these amounts each year for 
four years for each child when the child is age 19 to 22. 
The final assumption to discuss concerns longevity.  The default assumption in 
ESPlanner is that users have maximum ages of life of 100.  Since the program is focused 
on economic security, this seems appropriate; users may live this long and need to plan 
for this eventuality.  But for purposes of understanding the marginal net taxes households 
pay, on average, the appropriate longevity assumption is expected, rather than maximum 
lifespan.  Hence, for this analysis, we run the stylized households through ESPlanner 
under the assumption that household heads and their spouses or partners live to age 85.  
This is greater than current life expectancy at birth, but seems appropriate given that we 
are considering households age 30, 45, and 60.  
 
V.  Results 
  Tables 2 and 3 present our calculated marginal net tax rates on current labor 
supply  for  couples  and  singles,  respectively.    The  increment  we  consider  in  current 
earnings is the maximum of $100 or 1 percent of current earnings.  Consequently, the   25 
marginal net tax rates we compute are relative to this increment.  We discuss below 
marginal net tax rates over 1 penny increments in earnings.  
The first impression one gets from glancing at these tables is that marginal rates 
calculated  with  respect  to  the  aforementioned  discrete  earnings  increments  are  either 
moderate or high for essentially all households except for very low-earning young and 
middle age couples as well as middle aged singles.  For all households with $20,000 or 
more in annual earnings, marginal net tax rates range from 24 percent to 45 percent.   
The  relationship  of  marginal  rates  to  income  is  anything  but  monotonic  in 
earnings.  Nor does it take on the U-shaped pattern suggested by optimal income tax 
theory (see Diamond, 1998).  Take couples age 30.  The marginal rate is –14 percent at 
$10,000 in earnings, 42 percent at $20,000, 24 percent at $50,000, 37 percent at $75,000, 
46 percent at $150,000, 37 percent at $200,000, and 44 percent at $500,000.  
In addition to anomalous patterns of marginal rates with income, holding age 
constant, there are also unusual patterns with respect to age, holding income fixed.  Take 
singles earning $10,000.  Thirty-year old members of this group face a marginal net tax 
rate of 72 percent.  Were they age 45, their marginal rate would be –10 percent.  And 
were  they  60,  their  marginal  rate  would  be  39  percent.    As  another  example  of  the 
surprising relationships between age and marginal rates, note that rates fall with age for 
couples with $30,000 in earnings, but rise with age for couples with $75,000 in earnings.   
 
Explaining Patterns of Work Incentives by Age and Earnings 
How does one make sense of these findings? Well, the size of each marginal net 
tax rate is easily traced to underlying marginal changes in particular taxes or transfer   26 
payments.  Take, for example, married households age 30 that earn $10,000 per year.  
Their –14 percent net tax rate reflects the major marginal subsidy being provided to them 
by the Earned Income Tax Credit; this subsidy significantly exceeds the marginal payroll 
and sales and excise taxes they pay on additional earnings.
14  If this same household were 
to earn $20,000, rather than $10,000, its marginal net tax rate would be 42 percent rather 
than -14 percent.  The reason is that at this higher earnings level, the EITC is being 
clawed back at a rate of more than 20 cents on the dollar.  In addition, the household 
pays, at the margin, FICA and state income taxes and also gets hit by sales and excise 
taxes.   
Next  consider  the  $10,000  couple,  but  at  age  60.    Unlike  their  younger 
counterparts, this couple is no longer eligible for the EITC because it no longer has young 
children and its earnings exceed the income cutoff.  On the other hand, the couple does 
receive Food Stamps.  But because it has no young children, the couple is in the Food 
Stamps claw back range, where it loses 24 cents in Food Stamps per dollar earned.  This 
marginal  tax  in  conjunction  with  the  15.3  employer  and  employee  FICA,  the 
Massachusetts 5.3 percent income tax, the Massachusetts 5.0 percent sales tax, and the .9 
percent assumed federal excise tax rate delivers a net marginal rate of 51 percent.
15 
As a third example of one’s ability to precisely trace the anomalous nature of 
these marginal net taxes, consider 30 year old singles who earn only $10,000 per year.  
Unlike their married counterparts who face a 14 percent subsidy on additional current 
earnings,  these  single  households  face  a  72  percent  marginal  net  tax.  The  major 
difference between the two cases involves the clawback of TADFC.  Because the single 
                                                            
14 This household pays no state income tax at the margin. 
15 To be clear, there are interactions in the separate marginal net tax provisions, so these rates are not 
simply additive for this or any other household.     27 
household’s family size is smaller, it faces the TADFC clawback of 100 cents on the 
dollar when it earns $10,000, whereas the married household faces this effective marginal 
tax only at a higher earnings level.   
Surprisingly, if the $10,000 single household is age 45 rather than age 30, the 
marginal  net  tax  is  –10  percent  rather  than  72  percent.    What  explains  this  huge 
difference? The answer has to do with the TAFDC benefit.  Because the 45 year-old 
single  household  has  older  children,  it  no  longer  qualifies  for  the  TAFDC  daycare 
allowance or, consequently, any TAFDC benefits.   At the margin it therefore faces no 
TAFDC clawback tax.  On the other hand, its earnings are so low that it’s in the Earned 
Income Tax Credit’s positive subsidy range.  This subsidy is sufficiently high to produce 
a negative net marginal tax on labor supply notwithstanding the state, FICA, sales, and 
excise taxes this household must pay on marginal earnings.   
If we advance this household’s age by another 15 years and consider it at age 60, 
we find it again faces a very high, positive marginal net tax, in this case 39 percent.  
Because this household’s children are now grown, it finds itself in the EITC clawback 
range, which contributes significantly to the total net marginal tax it faces.  
Tracing each household’s marginal net tax on supplying more current earnings is 
one thing.  Understanding why anyone would intentionally design a fiscal system with 
such a bizarre pattern of work incentives by age and earnings is another.  The explanation 
is that these patterns are unintended.  Indeed, for federal and state government officials to 
have intentionally designed these incentives would have required them to know what they 
were doing.  But, to our understanding, this is the very first study to have incorporated all   28 
of the major federal and state tax-transfer programs.
16  Thus, those who designed this 
sausage could literally not have known what they were doing.   
But why didn’t they try to find out? The answer is that no single government body 
is responsible for the overall structure of our fiscal incentives.  Instead, the twenty or so 
major tax-transfer programs/provisions that combine to produce these bizarre incentives 
are being set by various federal and state governmental committees/bodies each of whom 
ignore, for the most part, the workings of the others and focus only on the details of the 
program/provision over which they have responsibility.  
 
Marginal Net Tax Rates on Life-Cycle Labor Supply  
Table 4 presents marginal life-cycle net tax rates for our 30-year old households.  
In these calculations, the increment in annual earnings is the maximum of $100 or 1 
percent of each year’s earnings.  First consider couples.  Their net tax rates are generally 
similar to the current marginal tax rates reported in Table 2 for 30 year-old couples.  The 
main differences occur at $10,000, $50,000, and $500,000 in income.  At these income 
rates the life-cycle net tax rates are significantly higher than the current-year rates.  This 
is not to suggestion that life-cycle rates are always higher for given income levels.  There 
are several income levels in tables 2 and 4 at which the life-cycle rates are lower.   
For single households age 30, life-cycle and current-year marginal rates are very 
different for earnings below $125,000, but quite similar at that level of earnings and 
above.  Take the $10,000 earnings case.  The current-year marginal net tax rate is 72 
                                                            
16 To its credit, the Congressional Budget Office has been providing Congress with detailed studies of 
marginal effective federal income tax rates.  But Congressional Budget Office (2005) and prior studies do 
not include state income taxes, sales or excise taxes, or any of the seven major transfer programs included 
here.    Moreover,  these  studies  do  not  use  a  dynamic/intertemporal  model  and,  consequently,  can  not 
address saving or life-cycle labor supply incentives.  
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percent, whereas the life-cycle rate is only 2 percent.  At $75,000 in earnings, the life-
cycle rate is 76 percent, whereas the current-year rate is 37 percent.  Part of what is going 
on here is that low-income households that are eligible for Medicaid, TAFDC, and other 
welfare benefits in the current year will not be receiving these benefits throughout their 
lives  because  of  changes  in  their  household  demographics  and  levels  of  non-labor 
income.   
 
Budget Constraints    
  Now  that  we’ve  provided  a  broad  brush  overview  of  marginal  net  tax  rates 
measured over discrete intervals, we turn to a more detailed analysis of the highly non-
linear and complex budget constraints facing typical earners.  The figures at the end of 
the paper show current year and lifetime budget constraints.  The current year budget 
constraints relate current year net income to current year gross income.  The slope of this 
constraint  determines  the  current  year  marginal  net  tax  rate.    The  lifetime  budget 
constraints  show  how  the  present  value  of  lifetime  spending  varies  with  annual  real 
earnings, where we’re assuming the same annual earnings in all years of work.
17  The 
slope of this budget constraint determines what we’ve been referring to as the life-cycle 
marginal net tax rate.  We also present figures indicating marginal net tax rates on current 
labor supply as well as the marginal net tax rates on life-cycle labor supply confronting 
30 year-old households.   
Take,  as  an  example,  the  figure  relating  current  net  income  to  current  gross 
income for 45 year-old couples.  And consider a $25,000 initial total household earnings 
                                                            
17 The present value of lifetime spending includes here the present value of non-Social Security transfer 
payments, which, to recall, we are treating as being consumed/spent in the year received.     30 
level, which is close to what the head and spouse would collectively earn were they to 
work full time at the minimum wage.   This income places the couple about 30 percent 
above the federal poverty line, but is low enough that the whole family is eligible for 
Medicaid  benefits  in  Massachusetts.    Recall  that  this  household  has  two  dependent 
children, both of whom are college bound.  It also has a $75,000 house with a fifteen year 
remaining mortgage whose balance is just over $30,000.  
  Because of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, and other benefits 
provided by federal and state transfer programs, this household has net income of just 
over $40,000 per year. If the couple earns additional wage income, several things will 
happen.  First, every additional dollar earned will generate a clawback of the EITC at the 
rate  of  21  cents  per  dollar  earned.    More  importantly,  if  the  couple  earns  enough 
additional income, it will lose eligibility for roughly $15,000 in Medicaid benefits.  The 
figure showing marginal net tax rates levied on this household’s current labor supply 
identify  where  these  rates  become  extremely  high.    This  occurs  at  points  where  the 
households’ incomes exceed income-test thresholds for the various transfer programs.   
One way to appreciate the size of work disincentives facing this household is to 
ask how much more it must earn, after losing all its benefits, to achieve the same living 
standard it enjoys when earning $25,000 and receiving all its benefits.  The answer is 
roughly $50,000.  I.e., the couple has to double its earnings simply to break even with 
respect to maintaining its living standard.  Such high net taxes apply to all low-income 
households, regardless of age or marital status.   
  The life-cycle labor supply budget figures as well as their associate marginal net 
tax-rate diagrams also indicate kinks and high rates of marginal net taxes but these kinks   31 
and high rates don’t necessarily line up with those associated with current labor supply.  
These life-cycle figures tell us not just about the incentives to work more each year, but 
also  about  the  incentives  to  take  costly  steps,  such  as  enhancing  one’s  education  or 
switching to a more demanding job, that will raise one’s annual earnings for a given level 
of labor supply by raising one’s hourly wage rate. 
  To further appreciate the nature of life-cycle labor supply disincentives, consider 
our 60 year-old couple earning only $10,000.  For this couple earning $55,000 a year for 
the  duration  of  its  working  life  is  only  marginally  better  than  earning  $10,000.  The 
$10,000/yr  household  has  remaining  lifetime  spending  of  $473,000  whereas  the 
$55,000/yr  household  will  spend  $480,000.  As  can  be  seen  in  the  figure  below,  all 
households  with  incomes  between  $10,000  and  $55,000  will  have  lower  remaining 
lifetime spending than the $10,000 household. The reason is simple: between $12,000 
and $13,000/yr in income, the couple loses its Medicaid benefits in retirement, thanks to 
the Medicaid asset test, and between $17,000 and $18,000/yr in income it loses Medicaid 
benefits from age 60-65. These losses (which occur every year between age 60 and death) 
amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars in present value.  
  Younger households face similar life-cycle budget constraints, but the life-cycle 
labor  supply  disincentives  are  considerably  smaller.  This  is  because  Medicaid 
expenditures comprise a larger fraction of remaining lifetime consumption at age 60 than 
age  30  or  45.  Discounting  these  future  losses  to  present  value  and  recognizing  that 
younger couples have far more years of working over which to make up the transfer 
losses makes clear why younger households are not as adversely affected. For 30 year old 
couples and singles, they must earn $10,000 to $15,000/yr more to overcome their loss of   32 
Medicaid when it occurs; 45 year olds must earn $15,000-25,000/yr more; and, to repeat, 
60 year olds must earn $25,000-$45,000/yr more. 
 
Measuring Marginal Net Taxes on Saving 
  Tables  5  and  6  present  our  marginal  net  tax  rates  on  regular  and  retirement 
account saving by age and earnings levels.  The increment in current saving we consider 
ranges from $500 to $5,500 depending on the household’s earnings level.  Consider first 
the regular saving findings for couples.   Most of the net tax rates fall in the range of 20 
to 40 percent.  The highest rate is 52 percent, which applies to 30 year-old households 
making  $500,000  per  year.    This  is  part  of  a  pattern  for  young  and  middle-aged 
households in which the net tax rate on regular saving rises with income.  But for 60 
year-old couples, the rate is 39 percent at the lowest earnings level, then falls to 22 
percent and then climbs to 36 percent for households with $500,000 in earnings.   
  The regular saving net tax rates for singles are far a-field from those for couples.   
For  very  low-earning,  young  and  middle  aged  singles,  the  rates  are  astronomical 
reflecting the impact of asset tests on various transfer benefits.  At higher incomes and at 
older ages, the rates range from around 20 percent to around 40 percent.  Above $34,000 
in annual earnings these rates generally rise. 
 
Measuring Retirement Account Tax Arbitrage Opportunities  
Tables 5 and 6 present our findings on tax arbitrage via contributions to tax-
deferred retirement accounts, which we reference as “401(k)”-type accounts and Roth 
accounts.  As indicated above, the results are presented in terms of cents of arbitrage gain   33 
per dollar of net contribution.   
Take, as an example, the 401(k) results for our 45 year-old couples with $70,000 
in total annual household earnings.  At the margin, these households can increase the 
present value of their lifetime consumption by 23.3 cents for every dollar they contribute 
on net (net of their immediate tax savings) to a tax-deferred retirement account.  This is a 
significant money machine.  But it’s de minimis compared with the 154.7 cent money 
machine available to 30 year-old couples with $500,000 in annual earnings.  On the other 
hand, it’s huge compared with the .7 cent money machine available to 30-year old single 
households with earnings of $15,000.   
As the two tables indicate, the arbitrage opportunities are greatest for high-earning 
young and middle-aged households and for older households.  That said, the pattern of 
arbitrage opportunities by age and earnings is far from monotonic with respect to either 
age or by earnings.  Take singles households with $35,000 in annual earnings.  The size 
of their 401(k) money machine is 16.3 cents at age 30, 64.9 cents at age 45, and 32.0 
cents at age 60.  Or consider couples age 60. If they earn $20,000 per year in total, their 
401(k) money machine generates 171.1 cent per net dollar contributed.  With $70,000 in 
annual  earnings,  their  401(k)  machine  produces  only  28.0  cents  per  net  dollar 
contributed.  But at $500,000 in annual earnings, the machine has improved.  It now 
produces 49.2 cents per net dollar contributed.  
The  Roth  arbitrage  opportunities  are  uniformly  smaller  than  the  401(k)-type 
arbitrage opportunities.
18  Nonetheless, they can be quite substantial.  For example, 45-
year old singles earning $100,000 per year stand to receive 32.1 cents per dollar placed in 
                                                            
18  This  analysis  abstracts  from  potential  future  tax  hikes  that  could  significantly  limit  the  marginal 
arbitrage gain available from contributing to tax-deferred retirement accounts.    34 
a Roth account.
19   The top Roth arbitrage opportunity is that of couples age 30 with 
$500,000 in annual earnings.  Their money machine generates 121.9 cents for free for 
each dollar they place in a Roth account.   
As in the case of marginal net tax rates on labor supply and saving, one can 
decipher the reason a particular arbitrage opportunity is of a given size.  In this regard, 
the  5.7  cent  and  171.1  cent  respective  arbitrage  opportunities  of  30  and  60  year-old 
couples earning $20,000 are worth comparing.  The 30 year-olds have zero (or very small 
positive)  federal  tax  obligations  at  age  30,  before  considering  the  EITC.    To  take 
advantage of the federal Saver’s Credit, they must be paying positive federal taxes.  
The Saver’s Credit, enacted in 2001, matches low-income households’ retirement 
account contributions by as much as dollar for dollar, but it does so by reducing their tax 
payments  to  the  extent  these  payments  are  positive;  i.e.,  the  Saver’s  Credit  is  not 
refundable, making many low-income households ineligible for it.  
Our 60 year-old couple with $20,000 is low-income, but is eligible for the Saver’s 
Credit.  The reason is that the couple no longer has dependent children. With fewer 
deductions, its adjusted gross income is higher than that of its 30 year-old analogue, 
resulting in a higher (positive) federal tax liability.  So when these households contribute 
to  a  401(k)  vehicle,  they  not  only  reduce  their  current  taxes  by  exempting  their 
contribution to the 401(k) from their taxable income; they also reduce them because of 
the Saver’s Credit.  These factors, in combination with the fact that these households will 
be  in  very  low  tax  brackets  in  the  future,  explain  the  fantastic  size  of  this  arbitrage 
opportunity.  
                                                            
19 Note that all contributions to Roth accounts are on a net basis because there is no reduction in current 
taxes associated with adding to one’s Roth account.   35 
Interestingly, the same age-60 couple has a much smaller arbitrage potential if it 
contributes not to a 401(k)-type vehicle, but to a Roth account.   In this case, the money 
machine spews forth only 47.5 cents per dollar contributed.  The reasons this machine 
does  so  poorly  compared  to  the  401(k)  machine  number  two.    First,  the  Roth 
contributions generate no immediate reduction in taxes.  Hence, there is no ability, as 
there is with the 401(k) contribution, to arbitrage between current high and future low 
marginal tax brackets.  Second, each dollar of net contribution to a 401(k) entails a larger 
gross contribution than in the case of a contribution to a Roth account.  Since the Saver’s 
Credit is paid on the basis of the gross contribution, not the net contribution, a given net 
contribution to a 401(k)-type account generates a much larger Saver’s Credit than does 
the same size net contribution made to a Roth account.  
  Another  comparison  between  arbitrage  incentives  that’s  worth  making  is  that 
between 45 year-old 401(k) contributing couples who earn $25,000 per year and those 
who earn $35,000.  The lower-earning couple is again not eligible to receive the Saver’s 
Credit because of its negligible federal tax obligations, whereas the higher earning couple 
is so eligible.   
  A final arbitrage opportunity worth highlighting is that of 30 year-old couples 
with $500 in total annual earnings.  These couples can earn 154.7 cents for free per net 
dollar placed in a 401(k)-type account.  This reflects the value of their current tax saving, 
the fact that they are in much lower tax brackets in the future, and their ability to benefit 
from tax-deferral (the ability to earn capital income on a tax-free basis).  As the size of 
the corresponding Roth arbitrage opportunity makes clear, the deferral advantage for this 
household is significant.     36 
  
V.  Conclusion 
  The study of effective marginal tax rates is hardly new.
20  Nor is the observation 
that transfer programs can dramatically affect effective marginal tax rate calculations, and 
that  marginal  rates  depend  critically  and  sensitively  on  household  demographic  and 
economic circumstances.  But what is new here is the inclusion in one study of all the 
major tax and transfer programs/elements that materially affect incentives to work and 
save.  On the tax side, this list includes federal and state personal income, corporate 
income, sales and excise, and payroll taxes.  On the transfer side, the list includes Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, and TAFDC benefits.  
America’s  tax-transfer  system  confronts  the  vast  majority  of  American 
households with either high, very high, or astronomically high total effective marginal tax 
rates  on  labor  supply  and  saving.    It  also  provides  very  substantial  tax  arbitrage 
opportunities to a subset of households, particularly those with high incomes or advanced 
ages.  
The pattern of net marginal tax rates and arbitrage opportunities with respect to 
age, marital status, and earnings is quite simply all over the map.  But this is what one 
would expect given the amazing complexity of the fiscal system, the fact that the various 
components  of  the  system  are  being  developed  with  little  or  no  thought  to  their 
interaction,  and  that  the  various  governmental  bodies  responsible  for  the  different 
elements of our tax-transfer system appear to make little or no attempt to understand the 
overall  work  and  saving  disincentives  as  well  as  arbitrage  opportunities  they  are 
                                                            
20 Recent contributions to the literature on marginal net tax rates include CBO (2005) and Feenberg and 
Poterba (2003).    37 
producing.  
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Table 1 























$10,000  $2,500  $2,500  $30,000  $24,000  $300  $300  $150 
$15,000  $3,750  $3,750  $45,000  $36,000  $450  $450  $225 
$25,000  $6,250  $6,250  $75,000  $60,000  $750  $750  $375 
$35,000  $8,750  $8,750  $105,000  $84,000  $1,050  $1,050  $525 
$50,000  $12,500  $12,500  $150,000  $120,000  $1,500  $1,500  $750 
$100,000  $25,000  $25,000  $300,000  $240,000  $3,000  $3,000  $1,500 
























$20,000  $5,000  $5,000  $60,000  $48,000  $600  $600  $300 
$30,000  $7,500  $7,500  $90,000  $72,000  $900  $900  $450 
$50,000  $12,500  $12,500  $150,000  $120,000  $1,500  $1,500  $750 
$70,000  $17,500  $17,500  $210,000  $168,000  $2,100  $2,100  $1,050 
$100,000  $25,000  $25,000  $300,000  $240,000  $3,000  $3,000  $1,500 
$200,000  $50,000  $50,000  $600,000  $480,000  $6,000  $6,000  $3,000 
$500,000  $125,000  $50,000  $1,500,000  $1,200,000  $15,000  $15,000  $7,500 
   40 
Table 2 
 




Total Annual Household Earnings ($000s) 
 
Age  10  20  30  50  75  100  150  200  300  500 
30  -14.2%  42.5%  42.3%  24.4%  36.9%  37.0%  45.9%  36.8%  43.9%  44.0% 
45  -11.4%  41.7%  41.8%  35.8%  36.1%  36.1%  45.1%  35.9%  40.9%  43.2% 











Total Annual Household Earnings ($000s) 
 
Age  10  20  30  50  75  100  125  150  200  250 
30  72.3%  42.9%  42.9%  37.0%  37.0%  36.1%  36.2%  36.9%  42.0%  41.5% 
45  -9.8%  42.9%  42.6%  37.0%  36.9%  36.1%  36.1%  36.9%  42.0%  41.5% 












 Total Annual Household Earnings  ($000s) 
 
10  20  30  50  75  100  150  200  300  500 




Total Annual Household Earnings ($000s) 
 
10  20  30  50  75  100  125  150  200  250 
0.8%  34.7%  36.7%  32.6%  34.6%  39.5%  37.3%  37.7%  40.3%  41.3% 
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Table 5   
 






Marginal Effective Tax on Regular Saving 
 
  Total Household Annual Income ($000s) 
Age  20  30  50  70  100  200  500 
30  20.5%  20.1%  20.5%  23.3%  24.9%  32.0%  51.5% 
45  20.1%  21.4%  22.0%  22.6%  25.9%  30.3%  43.4% 
60  38.6%  22.1%  22.0%  27.9%  34.1%  34.3%  36.5% 
  
 
401(k) Arbitrage Opportunity 
 
  Total Household Annual Income ($000s) 
Age  20  30  50  70  100  200  500 
30  5.7¢  5.6¢  5.9¢  8.6¢  20.4¢  53.9 ¢  154.7¢ 
45  6.2¢  7.5¢  24.1¢  23.3¢  21.4¢  44.1¢  79.9¢ 
60  171.1¢  183.9¢  46.4¢  28.0¢  36.1¢  47.7¢  49.2% 
  
 
Roth Arbitrage Opportunity 
 
  Total Household Annual Income ($000s) 
Age  20  30  50  70  100  200  500 
30  1.1¢  0.9¢  1.2¢  3.9¢  19.1¢  33.4¢  121.9¢ 
45  1.1¢  2.9¢  4.0¢  4.4¢  17.6¢  30.8¢  57.0¢ 
60  47.5¢  48.0¢  16.2¢  15.6¢  25.3¢  23.9¢  27.8¢ 
   42 
 
Table 6  
 






Marginal Effective Tax on Regular Saving 
 
  Total Household Annual Income ($000s) 
Age  10  15  25  35  50  100  250 
30  82.7%  260.4%  18.8%  18.7%  20.4%  25.5%  30.6% 
45  109.4%  19.6%  19.7%  20.1%  20.2%  30.7%  39.2% 
60  20.5%  41.4%  22.0%  23.4%  30.3%  37.6%  35.8% 
  
 
401(k) Arbitrage Opportunity 
 
  Total Household Annual Income ($000s) 
Age  10  15  25  35  50  100  250 
30  1.0¢  0.7¢  5.5¢  16.4¢  5.4¢  31.0¢  73.4¢ 
45  5.8¢  5.9¢  6.6¢  64.9¢  18.0¢  33.8¢  69.4¢ 
60  47.7¢  76.2¢  64.1¢  32.0¢  42.0¢  33.6¢  55.4¢ 
  
 
Roth Arbitrage Opportunity 
 
  Total Household Annual Income ($000s) 
Age  10  15  25  35  50  100  250 
30  1.0¢  0.7¢  0.6¢  0.6¢  2.2¢  28.6¢  53.3¢ 
45  1.3¢  0.9¢  1.7¢  9.6¢  1.4¢  32.1¢  50.6¢ 
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Gross Income vs. Net Income (1 year)
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Gross Income vs. Net Income (1 year)
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SINGLES 
Gross Income vs. Net Income (1 year)
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Gross Income vs. Net Income (1 year)
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Gross Income vs. Net Income (1 year)
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Appendix 
Our Transfer Calculator 
  The following is a list of the non-Social Security transfer benefit calculated by our 
transfer calculator. 
 
-  Transitional Assistance to Families with Dependent Children (TAFDC) 
-  Food Stamps (FS) 
-  Medicaid 
-  Medicare 
-  Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 
-  Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) 
-  Special Supplemental Nutrition Program For Women, Infants And Children (WIC) 
 
The  annual  levels  of  each  transfer  benefit  are  determined  taking  into  account  all 
eligibility criteria, which often include demographics (e.g., number and ages of children), 
as well as applicable income and asset tests.  Each program has, however, eligibility rules 
and benefit formulae that deal with special cases.  For this study, we consider the rules 
and benefit formulae that apply to the standard cases.  
 
 
Modeling Specific Benefit Programs 
 
Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent Children -- TAFDC 
Transitional  Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent  Children  (TAFDC)  is  a  cash  assistance 
program  designed  to  assist  needy  families  with  dependent  child  or  pregnant  women. 
TAFDC is the formal name in Massachusetts of the program formerly known as AFDC 
(Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent  Children).    Most  states  have  adopted  the  name 
Temporary  Assistance  to  Needy  Families  (TANF).    The  terms  “transitional”  and 
“temporary” reflect the new objective of the programs, namely to provide short-term 
assistance to needy families and to encourage such families to return to the labor force. 
Under  the  current  rules  of  the  TAFDC,  eligible  household  may  generally  receive 
assistance for no more than 24 months within any 5-year period.  
 
There are several steps in defining eligibility for benefits. The calculations needed to 
determine  eligibility,  both  non-financial  and  financial,  and  benefit  levels  can  be 
complicated even for the standard cases we consider.  
 
Non-Financial Eligibility requires that the child must be deprived of the care or support 
of at least one parent.  Deprivation factors include: death, continued absence, physical or 
mental incapacity, unemployment or underemployment of (a) parent(s).  A dependent 
child may be under age 19 or, if a fulltime school student, age 19. We assume that our 
family units meet these program-specific requirements.   
 
To  meet  requirements  for 
Household 
Size
Eligibility Standard (185% 
of the Need Standard)
Need Standard/ 
Payment Standard
2 982  531 
3 1,171  633 
4 1,352  731   64 
Financial Eligibility a household must pass two income tests. First, family unit gross 
income cannot exceed 185 percent of the Need Standard that applies given family size.  
Second,  gross  income  minus  certain  applicable  deductions  cannot  exceed  the  Need 
Standard itself.  
 
Standard monthly deductions include 
-  a $90 deduction for each employed family member. 
-  an extra $30 plus one-half of gross income above $120 deduction for the employed 
TAFDC  benefit  recipients  or  applicants  who  received  benefits  in  the  previous  4 
months.  
-  dependent-care deductions that range between $50 to $200 for a child under two and 
$44-$175 for a child 2 or over, depending on the hours worked by a recipient. 
 
We applied the $90 deduction per working individual for all 12 months of each year of 
eligibility and the maximum deduction levels for childcare for children between ages 1 
and 5.   However, we did not implement the extra deduction because  of its complex 
dynamic nature.   
 
If the family unit passes both income tests it gets financial assistance defined as the 
difference between the maximum payment standard and net income after deductions.  In 
accordance with standard program restrictions on the length of benefit receipt, we limited 
the receipt of benefits to no more than 24 months within any five-year period.  Hence, for 
those of our stylized households who are eligible for assistance, benefits follow a cyclical 
pattern: two years on followed by three years off, provided the asset test criterion is met. 
TAFDC regulation in Massachusetts assumes that families receiving benefits may also 
receive $40 of monthly housing allowance, which we add to the monthly TAFDC benefit. 
 
Sources 




The purpose of the Food Stamp Program is to improve the diet of low-income families by 
increasing their food purchasing power.  Households must satisfy both state and federal 
requirements to qualify for food stamps.  There are several steps in determining program 
eligibility and calculating the value of the stamp benefits. 
 
First, gross monthly (earned and unearned) income cannot exceed the limits specified in 
the  table  below  for  households  of  different  sizes.    Unearned  income  includes  Social 
Security and private pension benefits, SSI benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, 
and TAFDC payments.  In our study we include SSI and TAFDC payments as part of the 
income used to calculate the value of food stamps.  
 
The following monthly deductions apply: 









1 1,009  776 149 
2 1354 1041 274
3 1698 1306 393
4 2043 1571 499
-  $134 per household. 
-  20 percent of gross income. 
-  Dependent day care: under 2 years of age, up to $200 per month; over 2 years of age, 
up to $175 per month. We apply here the TAFDC program dependent care deduction 
for every child between the ages of 1 and 5. 
-  Medical expenses of individuals over 60 years old are deductible beyond the first $35. 
These  expenses  are  calculated  as  the  sum  of  payments  for  prescription  drugs, 
Medicare premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance payments.  
-  Excess housing costs, which are defined as housing expenses in excess of half of the 
household' s income after other deductions.  Prior to age 60 there is a maximum level 
of $388 for deductible excess housing costs.  
 
Net monthly income (monthly income after deductions) cannot exceed the family-size 
specific  limits  given  in  the  table  below.    The  value  of  the  stamps  is  the  maximum 
monthly allotment less 30 percent of net income.  The 30 percent figure reflects the 











Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the aged and disabled (we ignore 
disability benefits and focus on the benefits for the aged only). It incorporates two parts: 
Hospital Insurance (HI), also known as “Part A”, and Supplementary Medical insurance 
(SMI), also known as “Part B”. Hospital Insurance is generally provided automatically to 
individuals aged 65 and over who are entitled to Social Security benefits. Part A helps 
pay for care in hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, hospice, and some home health care. 
Enrolling  in  SMI  is  optional;  part  B  helps  pay  for:  doctors,  outpatient  hospital  care, 
clinical  laboratory  tests,  durable  medical  equipment,  most  supplies,  and  some  other 
services not covered by Part A. 
 
Medicare Part A is primarily financed through a mandatory 2.9 percent payroll tax.  Part 
B is financed in part by participant premium payments of $78.20 per month regardless of 
benefits received.  In addition, there are specific cost-sharing arrangements. In particular, 
under Part A in each benefit period a recipient of benefits pays: $776 for a hospital stay 
of 1-60 days; an additional $194 per day for days 61-90; an additional $338 per day for 
days 91-150; and all costs for each day beyond 150 days.  
 
We assume that at age 65 both husband and wife enroll in both Part A and Part B. It is   66 
typical for individual to enroll in both plans. We assumed that in each year an individual, 
if s/he receives benefits, stays in the hospital less than 60 days and so pays the fixed fee 
of $776. Under Part B, participants receiving benefits must first meet an annual $110 
deductible  and,  in  most  cases,  cover  20  percent  of  the  approved  amount  after  the 
deductible.  
 
In  our  calculations,  we  impute  to  each  age-eligible  spouse  at  a  particular  age  their 
expected net Medicare benefits at that age. Any actual out-of-pocket cost sharing and 
premium payments were deducted from the gross income in calculations of the Food 
Stamps benefits for eligible individuals. 
 
Our  data  on  Medicare  benefits 
for  aged  come  from  the 
Dartmouth  Atlas  of  Healthcare 
Database.
21  This  database 
provides  average  Medicare 
benefits under Part A and under 
Part B classified by age and sex 
in  2003.  We  found  that,  in  the 
recent past, average benefits per 
person enrolled were 26 percent 
and 5 percent greater, respectively, under Plan A and Plan B, in Massachusetts compared 
to the national averages. We incorporated that adjustment for all age cohorts and both 
sexes.  We  converted  all  2003  amounts  to  2005  dollars  using  CPI  for  medical 
expenditures, provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 
Sources 
1. Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare Database (September 2005). 




Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides medical care to the poor.  In 2002 
Medicaid recipients constituted 17 percent of the US population.  Over 50 percent of all 
Medicaid income-eligible infants, children, and adults had no access to any other form of 
private  or  public  health  insurance.    However,  not  all  eligible  individuals  apply  for 
Medicaid.  For purposes of this study we assume that our households, when eligible, do 
apply and receive all Medicaid benefits to which they are entitled.  
 
Medicaid  covers  most,  but  not  all,  medically  necessary  medical  care  and  services 
provided to eligible individuals. Each state establishes its eligibility standards and general 
rules.  The  policies  are  complex  and  vary  considerably  from  state  to  state.    In 
Massachusetts, Medicaid is officially known as MassHealth.  In addition to serving the 
poor  in  general,  MassHealth  incorporates  special  programs  to  assist  poor  pregnant 
women and children, the disabled, and immigrants who are in need of emergency care.  
                                                            
21 Access to these data was generously provided to us by Professor Jonathan Skinner of Dartmouth College. 
Medicare Reimbursement per Eligible Enrollee (2005)
Part A Part B
Age Men Women Men Women
65-69 2,987 2,504 2,104 2,218
70-74 3,923 3,368 2,731 2,640
75-79 5,005 4,376 3,249 2,912
80-84 6,004 5,274 3,498 2,877
85+ 7,072 6,400 3,413 2,581  67 
 
MassHealth provides the following services: 
-  Inpatient hospital services 
-  Outpatient services: hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists (limited dental coverage for 
adults), family planning, and home-health care 
-  Medical  services:  lab  tests,  X  rays,  therapies,  pharmacy  services,  dental  services, 
eyeglasses, hearing aids, medical equipment and supplies, adult day health, and adult 
foster care 
-  Mental health and substance abuse services: inpatient and outpatient 
-  Living in nursing homes 
-  Payment of the Medicare premium, coinsurance, and deductibles for certain groups of 
elderly  
 
Like  Medicare,  Medicaid  operates  as  a  vendor  payment  program;  recipients  receive 
benefits directly in the form of medical services provided by qualified vendors.  Benefits 
are provided as long as the individual meets general and financial eligibility criteria. 
Financial  eligibility  criteria  include  income  eligibility  requirements,  which  may  be 
different for different family members, and assets eligibility requirements.  MassHealth 
Standard Program specifies that the family monthly income before taxes and deductions 
cannot exceed: 
 
-  200 percent of the FPL (Federal Poverty Level) for pregnant women and infants 
-  150 percent of the FPL for children under age 19 
-  133 percent of the FPL for parents with children under age 19 
 
Under MassHealth the income limit for an eligible individual (couple) aged 65 and over 
is 100 percent of the FPL.  In addition, in Massachusetts if an individual is eligible for 
SSI, s/he would also be eligible for Medicaid.  The table below presents the respective 




Size 100% 133% 150% 200%
1 798 1,061 1,196 1,595
2 1,069 1,422 1,604 2,138
3 1,341 1,783 2,011 2,682
4 1,613 2,145 2,419 3,225
Federal poverty Lines (2005)
 
 
Medicaid eligibility may be extended to individuals with incomes greater than the above 
income limits if they are deemed “medically needy.” States provide residual financing of 
such individuals’ medical treatment costs, provided they spend their excess resources 
(income  and  assets)  down  to  the  eligibility  limits.    This  is  particularly  the  case  for 
individuals moving into nursing homes with insufficient resources to fully finance their 
stays.   For simplicity, we do not consider coverage of the medical needy in this analysis.  
 
In each year we determine for each family member of a particular age and sex if s/he   68 
meets appropriate income standards of eligibility and then allocate to that individual the 
Medicaid age- and sex-specific benefit projected to prevail in that year.  Fortunately, 
statistics on Medicaid eligibles, recipients, and total vendor payments are available by sex 
and age. When the beneficiary in our stylized case is a child under 19, we ignore gender 
difference in benefits.  
 
If a person over age 65 is eligible for Medicaid, his/her Medicare cost-sharing will be 
partially or fully financed by Medicaid.  There are two broad groups of dual-eligibles: 
those  for  whom  Medicaid  pays  only  Medicare  part  B  premiums  (so-called,  SLMB 
eligibles), and those who get extensive coverage from Medicaid (see the discussion on 
Medicaid-Medicare interactions below). Our calculated average benefit values for aged 
eligibles reflect Medicaid payments made for both these groups.  However, we impute 
full Medicaid benefits only to the elderly with  incomes less than 100 percent of the 
federal poverty line; and we treat SLMB eligibles separately.  Specifically, for those over 
65, who are eligible for the full coverage, we adjust the average Medicaid benefits by 
excluding payments for SLMB eligibles, using data on the fraction (4.6 percent) of those 
receiving benefits from both Medicare and Medicaid who are SLMB recipients, the size 
of the SLMB Medicaid benefit (equal to the annual Part B premium), and the overall 
average Medicaid benefit net of Nursing Home financing. Our final calculated adjusted 
age- and sex-specific Medicaid benefits for 2005 are presented in the table below.  We 
used the BLS index of medical expenditure growth to measure 2002 benefit levels in 
2005 dollars. 
 
Estimated 2005 Medicaid Benefits in 
Massachusetts, net of SLMB program financing
Average Net Benefit per Eligible
Age Female Male
All Ages 6,145 $                   5,711 $                
Under 1 3,468 $                   3,747 $                
1-5 1,839 $                   2,148 $                
6-12 1,660 $                   2,094 $                
13-14 2,134 $                   2,777 $                
15-18 2,807 $                   3,018 $                
19-20 2,814 $                   2,590 $                
21-44 4,503 $                   6,653 $                
45-64 10,216 $                 11,424 $              
65-74 9,353 $                   11,021 $              
75-84 15,914 $                 15,300 $              
85 AND OVER 26,960 $                 23,243 $                
 
In each year we determine for each family member of a particular age and sex if s/he 
meets appropriate income standards for eligibility and then allocate to that individual the 
Medicaid  age-  and  sex-specific  benefit  projected  to  prevail  in  that  year.    When  the 
beneficiary  in  our  stylized  case  is  a  child  under  19,  we  ignore  gender  difference  in 
benefits. 
 
Sources   69 
1.  2005 Health and Human Services poverty guidelines. Internet: 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/05poverty.shtml  
2.  MassHealth. Internet: www.mass.gov 
3.  Medicaid. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Internet: 
 http://www.cms.hhs.gov  
 
 
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 
 
Supplementary Security Income is a federal program that makes monthly payments to 
people who have limited income and resources if they are 65 or older or are disabled.  In 
our study we ignore payments to the disabled.  If individuals 
meet  the  program' s  income  limits,  after  deductions,  they 
receive monthly benefits.  Payments up to the Federal income 
limits are paid by the federal government, while states provide 
supplements that are calculated as the difference between state 
and federal income limits.  Standard deductions are $20 per month plus the sum of a) an 
additional $65 per month if labor income exceeds $65 per month and b) one-half of 
wages over $65.  In Massachusetts, an SSI-eligible person is automatically enrolled in 
Medicaid. 
 
For  every  year  we  first  determine  age  eligibility  for  each  spouse,  and  then  income 
eligibility for the household.  When both spouses are eligible, their combined benefit 
equals  the  difference  between  the  income  limit  for  a  two-person  household  and  the 
spouses’ combined income after deductions.  When only one spouse is age eligible, the 
eligible  spouse’s  benefit  is  calculated  according  to  the  regulations  using  either  an 
individual- or couple-income limit depending on the level of the income of the ineligible 
spouse.   
 
Sources 




Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) 
LIHEAP  is  a  block-grant  program  of  the  Federal  Government  that  allocates  funds 
between states to operate various home energy assistance programs for needy households. 
The funds may be used for the purposes of home heating and cooling assistance, energy-
crisis intervention, and low-cost weatherization or other energy-related home repairs. 
 
LIHEAP  assists  eligible  low-income  households  in  meeting  the  heating  or  cooling 
portion  of  their  residential  energy  needs.  Low-income  households  are  defined  as 
households with incomes that cannot exceed the greater of 150 percent of the poverty 
level or 60 percent of state median income ($31,952, $39,469, and $46,987 for 2-, 3-, and 
4- person families respectively in Massachusetts in 2005). The states have flexibility in 
setting their income eligibility at or below this maximum standard. LIHEAP payments 
can  be  made  to  households  where  one  or  more  persons  are  receiving  Supplemental 






2 1,071   70 
stamps. Priority may be granted to those households with the greatest energy cost in 
relation to income, taking into consideration the presence of children and elderly. 
 
In  Massachusetts  in  2004,  134  thousand  households  received  LIHEAP  benefits. 
However, this represents only 15.5% of LIHEAP-eligible households. As such, while the 
average benefit per recipient is $480, the amount received per eligible household is only a 
fraction thereof. In our calculations, we assume that each eligible household received 
15.5% of the maximum possible LIHEAP benefit according to their income test relative 
to the poverty line. 
 
Sources 
1.  Massachusetts  Department  of  Housing  and  Community  Development.  Internet: 
http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/cs/1PrgApps/LIHEAP/chart.pdf  
2.  Massachusetts  Department  of  Housing  and  Community  Development.  Internet: 
http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/cs/Fuel/default.htm#income%20chart  




Special Supplemental Nutrition Program For Women, Infants And Children (WIC) 
WIC is a program designed to improve the health of pregnant women, new mothers, and 
their  infants.  WIC  targets  population  groups  that  have  low  income  and  are  at  risk 
nutritionally, specifically:  
 
-  pregnant women through pregnancy and up to 6 weeks after birth or after pregnancy 
ends 
-  breastfeeding women through their infant' s first birthday; 
-  infants through their first birthday. 
-  children up to age 5. 
 
WIC  benefits  include:  supplemental  nutrition,  nutrition  counseling,  and  screening 
services.  In most WIC State agencies, WIC participants receive either actual food items 
or food vouchers to purchase specific foods to supplement their diets.  Different food 
packages are provided for different categories of participants. 
 
Although federally funded, WIC is administrated by state agencies and managed by local 
agencies.  The WIC Program has certain eligibility requirements that are based on income 
and nutritional risk.  In order to qualify, WIC applicants must show medically verified 
evidence of health or nutrition risk. In addition, their family income generally must be 
below 185 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL).  Certain applicants can be judged 
income-eligible for WIC based on their participation in Food Stamps, Medicaid, and 
AFDC/TANF programs. WIC does not serve all eligible individuals - participation is 
limited by the availability of Federal funding.  Usually, program applicants are ranked by 
need.  
 
The estimated 2004 average monthly benefit for WIC recipients (be they women, infants, 
or children) in Massachusetts is $33.80. For our calculations, we assume that all eligible   71 
households receive this average benefit times the probability of receipt, which was 81 
percent in 2004. The average monthly benefit of the $33.80 multiplied by 0.81 is $27.38, 
which  implies  probability-adjusted  annual  benefits  of  $328.52  to  all  of  our  eligible 
households.   
 
Sources 
1.  WIC  Program.  Food  And  Nutrition  Service.  Internet:  http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/    and 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wisummary.htm 
2.  Massachusetts state government. Internet: http://www.mass.gov 
 
 